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Everyone knew, of course, that the copper price is purely the result of external factors. Yet, in post-independence Zambia there was no feeling whatsoever that “seven years of plenteousness” (Joseph in Egypt) might be followed by many more than seven years of famine. Six years after independence the March 1970 edition of Z, a beautifully illustrated magazine published by the Zambia Information Services, reports on impressive infra-structural achievements such as a new bridge over the Lufupa in Kasempa. This will definitely boost “our economic development traffic” between the country’s capital and North-Western Province, the article assures us. There is more on the economy: gravel extraction in Mongu, for example, and home woven textiles and glass fiber boats in Kafue. In terms of format the magazine could well compare to Time or Newsweek those days. Its price: 10n. The n stands for ngwee, the Kwacha cent that in those days was worth a Dutch “stuiver” (five cents of the Guilder). In forty years the Kwacha has dropped from ZK 0.2 to ZK 2,500 to the old Guilder (ZK 5,500 to the Euro). Its value, in other words, is now 1/12500th what it used to be in those plentiful years after independence. 

In that same year 1970 Zambia Information Services celebrated Independence Day with a freely distributed publication entitled “Zambia six years after”. Among the many achievements highlighted was the Mulungushi Hall with its VIP village of 62 houses, constructed to host the non-aligned summit with leaders as Marshall Tito and Indira Gandhi. The “magnificent” conference site is depicted as “the symbol of Zambian determination”. More appropriately, that copper decorated Hall could be seen as a symbol of Zambia’s careless dependence on its primary commodity. “Fortunately, however”, the booklet notes, “the copper industry has boomed –and kept on booming- at a time when Zambia needed it most”. President Kaunda’s announcement one year earlier that Zambia would take a controlling share “of the enormously rich copper mining industry” is described as “probably the greatest single step forward the Zambian economy will ever take.” 

We know now that nationalisation of that depressed industry has ended in complicated efforts towards re-privatisation. Today the country gets to our Dutch newspapers with headlines like “Average life expectancy Zambia reduced to 33 years”. (In the prosperous period it had gone up from in the forties to in the fifties.) Aids, the article tells us, takes 200 deaths per day. Infant mortality, too, is on the rise, already for many years, and the same applies to other indicators negatively affecting human development such as the illiteracy rate. The recent Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (2002) aims to reduce the percentage of the population living in severe income poverty from 73% (1998) to 65% (2004). Currently, however, the percentage is already above 80. A country for which in the nineteen seventies intensive lobbying was required to acquire the status of major recipient of Dutch development assistance as it was supposed to be “too rich”, now occupies rank 89 out of 94 on the United Nations Development Programme’s Human Poverty Index. (HDR 2003).

What went wrong? Obvious is that external factor: the collapse of the copper price. Notably, in the fat years after independence copper accounted for almost half the country’s Gross Domestic Product while providing more than two thirds of government income and almost the whole of the country’s exports. In 1972 came the first downfall; in response Kaunda still referred to “a blessing in disguise”. What he meant could best be illustrated by a little comparison with Malawi, a nopec country in the sense of lacking oil or any other primary resource such as copper. Visiting rural villages in Malawi even during the good years, one was always struck by a favourable comparison with Zambia’s outlying areas. Evidently, the Copperbelt had taken its toll. This, then, brings us to a second factor: the continuing impact of colonialism as not only a political but also an economic system. It brought the country structures that were in no way autochthonous. Thus, when the externally driven wealth was turned into externally driven misery, the country had nothing to fall back on. In an article written with my Tanzanian colleague Paschal Mihyo I have called this “a false start”, one that has had considerably more impact than the second false start René Dumont referred to in his “False Start in Africa”. The latter we may see as our third factor explaining Zambia’s current predicament: the substitution of a local elite for the colonial rulers, a new political class that was almost as unconnected to the rural peasants and the urban poor as their predecessors. Typical is what happened to the rural-urban barter terms of trade. At the time of independence a bag of maize sold by a rural producer in say Katete, could buy two pieces of chitenge or one pair of trousers; ten years later the same amount of “urban” produce would require two bags.

In the quest for explanations there is still one major factor that needs attention: development assistance. For the whole of Sub-Sahara Africa no macro-correlation whatsoever has been found between the amount of development aid received and the level of income poverty, while at the micro-level many instances have been exposed of a serious negative impact. Actually, there are important lessons to be learnt, first and foremost with regard to governance. As to the causes of persisting poverty Zambia’s recent Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper mentions, among other things, high inequality, external dependence, unsatisfactory planning and prioritisation, poor management and governance.  The latter is a major factor, and one we did not see forty years ago. The state’s institutional capacity was not in doubt, and in the context of an “international economic disorder” state-led development was seen as the only way. It is precisely in respect of governance that some major challenges present themselves today: in the realm of global governance in the first place –the structures of unfair trade have no less impact than forty years ago- but also in supporting local efforts towards improved governance at all levels.
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